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Summary 
 
 
In previous research efforts, we have shown that what seem to be sizable geographic differences in 
poverty rates in rural Peru can be almost fully explained by taking into account the spatial concentration of 
households with readily observable non-geographic characteristics - in particular, public and private 
assets. This does not mean that geography is not an important determinant of income inequality, but that 
its influence on poverty, expenditure level, and growth differentials arises through a spatially uneven 
provision of public infrastructure. However, the exact type, critical mass, and combination of public and 
private assets needed to move out of poverty have not been sufficiently studied.  
 
Our analysis tries to carry out further research in this area to contribute to more effective targeting of 
poverty alleviation efforts. We consider three types of public infrastructure and services in particular: a) 
“traditional infrastructure” such as transportation, sewer systems, water, electricity which do not generate 
positive network externalities; b) "human-capital-generating public services" that are capable of creating 
mobile private assets, such as schooling and health services and c) "information and communication 
technologies", such as telephone or Internet, all of which generate network externalities. Using the 
Peruvian LSMS data of 2000 and additional modules developed under this research effort we quantify the 
differential impact on poverty of each of these types of investments, as well as the interaction effect 
between so- called traditional types of infrastructure and those which generate network externalities. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Several authors1 have suggested that one of the fundamental causes of poverty, lack of economic 
growth and income inequality is an unequal access and possession of assets. In this respect 
modifications in the distribution of key assets underlie long-term changes in income distribution 
and growth.  
 
The dispersion of spending or income, as well as the probabilities of individuals and families of 
being poor or non-poor, depends on their stock of assets and their return or market price. 
Assuming, for the moment, that aside from possible interactions between different assets, the 
return on the possession of a unit of an asset of physical, human, financial, public or 
organizational capital does not depend on its level, the distribution of assets plays an important 
role in the determination of the distribution of income and spending. 
 
Despite the fact that access to public and private assets continues to be restricted and unevenly 
distributed in rural Peru, changes in the level and in the pattern of ownership of these assets 
during the last 15 years have been quite dramatic. For example, in 1985 the level of schooling of 
heads of household was very low and unequal in the rural sector. In 1997, average years of 
education had increased from 2.9 to 5, and inequality had declined: among the poorest sectors the 
schooling of the head almost doubled while among the richest the increase was 50%. The average 
family size in the poorest quintile was 50% higher than the average in the richest quintile. On the 
other hand, access to credit was relatively segmented, being very low in the poorest quintile.  The 
1997 Peruvian LSMS survey revealed that although global access to credit had fallen from 23% 
of farmers to 16%, it had increased for the poorest quintile and fallen for the other quintiles, 
particularly the richest. This is explained by the disappearance of the development banks, which 
concentrated on larger scale agriculture. In the case of access to basic services infrastructure 
(electricity, telephone services and water and sewerage), levels of access were low and highly 
inequitable in 1985. In contrast in 1997, at least in the case of water and electricity, access had 
doubled: 27% and 24% of households had access to these services, respectively. However 
dispersion in access by spending decile turned now to be much more pronounced than 15 years 
ago. This is so because the pattern of invest in public infrastructure had been biased against the 
poorest segments rural Peru leaving them in a poverty trap. 
 
The purpose of this research effort is to evaluate, using household and communal level surveys, 
the differential impact on poverty of each of the different types of investments in assets. We 
                                                          
1 See for example Londoño and Birdsall (1997) or Bebbington(1999). 
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consider three types of public goods and services: a) “traditional infrastructure” such as 
transportation, sewer systems, water, electricity which do not generate positive network 
externalities; b) "human-capital-generating public services" that are capable of creating mobile 
private assets, such as schooling and health services and c) "information and communication 
technologies", such as telephone or Internet, all of which generate network externalities.  
 
Even more, this research effort will also look at the interaction effect between the so-called 
traditional infrastructure and those that generate network externalities. In addition, given the 
indivisible and irreversible nature of most of these investments, we intend to evaluate the critical 
mass of investments of each type required to create the externalities and positive spillovers over 
private assets for effective poverty reduction strategies. 
 
The paper is divided in 5 sections including the introduction. In section two a brief overview of 
poverty and income inequality in Peru is carried out as well as a first link is made to the 
relationship with unequal access to assets. In section three we try to analyze the importance of 
sizable adverse geographic characteristics in Peru and how important are them as irreversible 
initial conditions explaining a possible poverty trap of households in those regions. We try to 
analyze how much of these initial adverse conditions can be explained when one takes into 
account the spatial concentration of households with readily observable non-geographic 
characteristics, in particular public and private assets. In other words, we show that the same 
observationally equivalent household has a similar expenditure level in one place as another with 
different adverse geographic characteristics such as high altitude or extreme temperatures. This 
does not mean, however that geography is not important but that its influence on expenditure 
level and growth differential comes about through a spatially uneven provision of public 
infrastructure. Furthermore, when we measured the expected gain (or loss) in consumption from 
living in one geographic region (i.e. coast) as opposed to living in another (i.e. highlands), we 
found that most of the difference in log per-capita expenditure between the highland and the coast 
regions of Peru can be accounted for by the differences in infrastructure endowments and private 
assets.  
Consistently, in section four, we concentrate our analysis in evaluating, using household and 
communal level surveys, the differential impact on poverty of each of these types of assets 
(human capital, traditional infrastructure and information and communication technologies), as 
well as their complementarities. In addition, given the indivisible and irreversible nature of most 
of these investments, we carry out a initial set of simulations as a first evaluation of the 
importance of a critical mass of investments of each type required to create the externalities and 
positive spillovers over private assets for effective poverty reduction strategies. Finally, section 
five summarizes our findings. 
 
 
II. Poverty and Asset Inequality in Peru 
 
Poverty in Peru has changed dramatically over the last three decades (see Table 1), experiencing 
not only an important reduction but also compositional changes. While in the early 1970s poverty 
was largely rural  -- two-thirds of the poor were rural dwellers employed in agriculture -- the 
picture reversed in the mid-1990s, at which point two-thirds of the poor were reported to be urban 
dwellers. Hence, while urban poverty rates have risen ten points over the last 28 years, in the 
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rural sector poverty has fallen 18 points.  In this sense, it is possible that the entire long-term 
reduction in poverty could be a rural phenomenon arising out of a major migratory process 2. 
 
Table 1 
Region 1971-72 1985 1991 1994 1997 2000
Peru 64 43.1 59 53.4 50.7 54.1
Urban 39.6 36 53.3 50.4 48.9 49.8
Rural 84.5 55.2 80.7 65.5 64.8 66.1
Authors’ own figures based on ENCA (1971-72) and ENNIV 1985-86, 1991,
1994, 1997 and 2000.
Poverty indicators by region: 1971, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 1996
(By family spending – Percentages)
 
 
Although, when we look to income distribution, as in most Latin American countries, Peru shows 
an improvement in the aggregated levels (see Graph 1). The Gini coefficient fell three percentage 
points between 1961 and 1971. However, taking into account the fact that the Gini coefficient for 
personal income is higher than the coefficient obtained from family income, it is not possible to 
state that there has been a reduction in income dispersion. Rather, it is most likely that the 
concentration levels of 1961 are similar to those of 1971-1972 3. Since 1971 a clear pattern of 
reduction in dispersion has been observed. As shown in Graph 1 the Gini coefficient of family 
income fell from 0.55 to 0.40 between the early 1970s and the 1990s. The percentage of total 
income received by the poorest half of the population rose from 10.7% to 24.5% in 1996, while 
the share of richest half fell from 61% to 43%. 
  
The trend in income distribution from the 1970s can also be corroborated by the estimate of 
indicators of concentration based on family spending 4. It is also interesting to note that the 
reduction in the dispersion of family or personal income or spending could have taken place both 
in periods in which average income was falling (e.g. 1985-86 to 1991) and in periods in which it 
was rising (1991 to 1994 or 1996). Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998) demonstrate that the 
empirical support for Kuznets’ suggested systematic relationship between growth and inequality 
is very weak. The Peruvian case also shows that there is no evident association between the 
economic cycle and inequality 5.  
 
The connection between asset endowments and poverty alleviation is well understood in the 
economic literature. For example, Londoño and Birdsall (1997) suggest that one of the 
fundamental causes of poverty and income inequality is unequal access to and possession of 
assets. In this respect, it should be possible to find modifications in the distribution of key assets 
that underlie these long-term changes in income distribution.  
 
                                                          
2 The 1991 survey does not include tropical forest areas and the rural coast, while the other surveys are representative 
at the national level.  
3 For example, in 1985-86, the Gini based on family income is 0.48 while that based on income per capita is 0.495. 
4 These results are shown in a more complete version of this document (see Escobal, Saavedra and Torero (1998)). 
5 More evidence on the time trend of inequality of income and spending using different databases is found in 
Saavedra and Díaz (1998). 
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The dispersion of spending or income, as well as the probabilities of individuals and families 
being poor or non-poor, depends on their stock of assets and its return or market price. Assuming, 
for the moment, that aside from possible interactions between different assets, the return on 
possession of a unit of an asset of physical, human, financial, public or organizational capital 
does not depend on its level, the distribution of the assets plays an important role in the 
determination of the distribution of income and spending. 
  
Table 2 shows the average level of possession or access to different key assets in Peruvian urban 
and rural sectors. Obviously assets are not totally exogenous variables. The possession of assets 
depends on the possession of other assets, on changes in acquisition prices and in the expected 
return on the assets. However, compared to previous years (see Escobal et.al  1998), patterns of 
possession and access to assets by position on the scale of spending were relatively similar, 
although the average in some cases had changed. For example, access to water increased, while 
access to electricity had increased substantially, with the exception of the poorest quintile. Access 
to telephones, average level of education, average years’ experience and the age of the head of 
household also rose, although the distribution did not varied substantially 6.  
                                                          
6 Access to public services was expected to increase significantly by 1997 under commitments made by the 
companies that acquired the privatized companies. 
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Table 2 
Average Average 
I II III IV V I II III IV V
Human Capital Assets
Average education attained by family 9.42 7.72 8.90 9.87 10.28 10.33 5.97 5.09 5.65 6.15 6.07 6.91
Average Education of the household head 9.36 7.29 8.38 9.26 10.29 11.60 6.07 5.11 5.64 6.16 6.35 7.08
Access to Primary School N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.81 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.81 0.78
Access to Secondary School N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.21
Communal Association N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.70 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.59
Access to Health services N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.36 0.27
Traditional Infrastructure
Drinkable water 0.89 0.79 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.35 0.20 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.46
Sewerage 0.84 0.67 0.79 0.86 0.91 0.97 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.18
Electricity 0.95 0.84 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.51
Distance to Roads * 5.83 7.60 3.69 7.23 8.98 1.64 2.45 3.29 2.75 2.57 2.10 1.54
Information and Communication Technologies
Telephone 0.36 0.07 0.18 0.34 0.49 0.74 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Access to Public Phones 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.23
* For Urban Peru de distance is to the nearest market
Quintiles
Rural Peru
Quintiles
Urban Peru
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To capture the level and the changes in the disparities in the ownership of assets, Gini 
coefficients were calculated for some of the assets for urban and rural areas (see Graph 2). The 
assets with the highest degree of dispersion in the urban area are possession of durable goods and 
the labor experience of the head of household. The education variables reveal relatively low 
dispersion, observing that the process of expansion of the educational system, which began in the 
1970s, is continuing. On the other hand when we look to the rural areas the highest inequality is 
on value of land (basically due to differences in quality), on the value of durable goods and on the 
proportion of members with migration experience.  Meanwhile as in the urban areas education 
had also reduce substantially as a consequence of the expansion process of the educational 
system. It is important to note that if these calculations were at national level, the inequality of 
many of these assets would be much greater because of the large gap in access to education and 
in infrastructure between urban and rural sectors.  
 
Graph 2 
Gini Coefficient of Access to Assets 
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III. The Geography Caveat 
 
Current literature had argued (Jalan, Ravallion;1998, Engerman, Sokoloff;1998) that 
geography has a causal role in determining how household welfare evolves over time. By 
this view, geographic externalities arising from natural geographic characteristics could 
be the main reason explaining why poor households cannot escape out of poverty. 
Instead, our hypothesis is that what seem to be sizable geographic differences in living 
standards in Peru can be almost fully explained when one takes into account the spatial 
concentration of households with readily observable non-geographic characteristics, in 
particular public and private assets. In other words, the same observationally equivalent 
household has a similar expenditure level in one place as in another with different 
geographic characteristics such as altitude or temperature. This does not mean, however 
that geography is not important, but that its influence on expenditure level and growth 
differential comes about through a spatially uneven provision of public infrastructure. If 
this is so, then it is important for policy to understand the importance of an adequate 
provision of public and private assets. 
Specifically in the case of Peru, the geography question is of great importance. The 
Peruvian astonishing variety of ecological areas, including 84 different climate zones and 
landscapes with rainforests, high mountain ranges and dry deserts, could play a large role 
in explaining regional variations in income and welfare (see Map.1 and 2). Therefore, we 
are interested in testing if geography plays or not a causal role in determining the 
evolution of household welfare over time (Escobal, Torero; 2000).  
 
Following Escobal and Torero (2000) and Ravallion and Wodon (1997) we break down 
the geographic effects into their component elements. For this purpose, we compute the 
expected gain (or loss) in consumption from living in one geographic region (coast for 
example) against living in another adverse geographic region (i.e. mountains) specifying 
how much of the gain is explained by geographical variables and location (urban or rural 
areas) and how much by the presence of all the types of infrastructure and private assets: 
( )$X XM C− β                          (1)    
where XM C, are the sample means for mountain and coast regions for example, and $β is 
the parameter of the respective variables under analysis (i.e. geographical, location, 
infrastructure and private assets)7. This break-down represents the differential impact on 
a household's standard of all non-excluded variables in the two regions. 
For this break-down we have assumed that parameters are stable across the three main 
geographic regions: coast, highland and jungle. This initial break-down is shown in Table 
3. In the first column we see that most of the difference in log per–capita expenditure 
between the highland and the coast can be accounted for by the differences in 
infrastructure endowments and private assets. In other words, once the main geographic 
variables are accounted for (altitude, temperature and surface characteristics), only 
private assets and infrastructure endowments are needed to explain regional expenditure 
                                                          
7 The parameter will came estimating expenditure as a function of geographic characteristics, private assets, 
and the different types of public assets. 
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differences. Similarly, the second column shows the break-down of the differences in log 
per–capita expenditure between the jungle area and the coast, showing again that once 
main geographic variables are accounted for most of the regional expenditure differences 
can be explained by infrastructure endowment and private asset composition. 
 
Map 1                                                                          Map 2 
                             Major Landforms in Peru                        Underlying Surface Composition in Peru 
 
 
Obviously, the fact that geography has no additional impact on regional per-capita 
expenditure differences has to do with the fact that key infrastructure variables such as 
school and medical facilities, access to electricity, water and sanitation, as well as private 
assets, have dampened the effect of geography on regional expenditure differentials. To 
see this, Table 4 performs the same break-down exercise introducing each set of variables 
sequentially. First geography variables are entered in the model alone and the break-
down exercise is conducted only with these variables. In this case, geography is highly 
significant in explaining per-capita expenditure differentials between the highland and 
coastal areas, as well as between the jungle and coastal areas of Peru. Geography remains 
highly significant even after we introduce location variables and their cross–products into 
the analysis. However, once infrastructure variables come into play in the analysis, the 
impact of geography disappears, as the coefficients associated with these types of 
variables are shown to be jointly non–significant. This could be because, in the models 
without infrastructure, the geography variables were choosing their effect and therefore 
when improving our specification  the effect of these variables disappears. 
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Table 3 
Group of variables Highland-Coast Jungle-Coast
Geography -0.163 0.031
Altitude -0.036 -0.004
Temperature -0.235 * 0.173 *
Temperature squared 0.117 -0.121
Igneous rocks 0.015 ~ -0.004 ~
Sediments rocks -0.004 -0.009
Land depth -0.022 -0.005
Location 0.050 0.039
Urbanization 0.055 0.038
Distance to province capital -0.005 0.001
Geography*location 0.081 ~ 0.007 ~
Urbanization*altitude 0.081 ~ 0.007 ~
Infrastructure -0.024 ~ -0.064 ~
Perinhabitant schools in town 0.024 0.023
Perinhabitant medical centers in town 0.010 0.009
Basic needs -0.058 * -0.095 *
Private assets -0.185 * -0.258 *
Household size -0.031 * -0.064 *
Schooling y ears (household head) -0.061 * -0.065 *
Schooling y ears (other members) -0.069 * -0.102 *
Potential labor experience -0.013 * -0.024 *
Household head gender 0.000 -0.001
Number of migrantes -0.009 ~ -0.005 ~
Spell of illness (household head) 0.000 0.000
Savings 0.002 * 0.000 *
Value of durable goods -0.003 0.004
Explained -0.241 -0.244
Residual 0.024 0.077
Total -0.217 -0.167
Note: *= p< .01, ~ = p< = .05, + = p< .1.
Source: Author's calculation based on 1994 LSMS.
Decomposition of Regional Per Capita Expenditure Differences
(Log  differen c es)
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Table 4 
Group of
variables 1 1+ 2 1+ 2+ 3 1+ 2+ 3+ 4 1 1+ 2 1+ 2+ 3 1+ 2+ 3+ 4
(1) Geography -0.239 * -0.162 ~ -0.283 ~ -0.163 -0.152 * -0.084 ~ -0.052 ~ 0.031
(2) Location -0.181 0.024 0.05 -0.123 0.021 0.039
(3) Geo*location 0.093 * 0.137 * 0.081 ~ 0.008 * 0.012 * 0.007 ~
(4) Infrastructure -0.118 * -0.024 ~ -0.237 * -0.064 ~
(6) Private assets -0.185 * -0.258 *
Explained -0.239 -0.250 -0.240 -0.241 -0.152 -0.199 -0.256 -0.244
Residual 0.022 0.033 0.023 0.003 -0.015 0.032 0.089 0.072
Total -0.217 -0.217 -0.217 -0.217 -0.167 -0.167 -0.167 -0.167
Source: Author's calculation based on 1994 LSMS.
Highland-Coast Jungle-Coast
Decomposition of Regional Per capita Expenditure Differences, by model
 
 
From this research we have shown that a poverty trap linked to adverse geographic 
conditions may be overcome with an adequate provision of private and public assets. 
However, the exact type, critical mass, and combination of public and private assets 
needed to overcome these poverty traps remain largely unstudied in Peru, along with 
presenting a knowledge gap in the international literature on poverty.  
 
Therefore in the next section we try to evaluate, using household- and community- level 
surveys, the differential impact on poverty of each of these types of investments, as well 
as the interaction effect between the so-called traditional forms of infrastructure and those 
that generate network externalities. In addition, given the indivisible and irreversible 
nature of most of these investments, we intend to evaluate the critical mass of 
investments of each type required to generate the externalities and positive spillovers 
onto private assets necessary for effective poverty reduction strategies. 
 
 
IV. Measuring the Relationship Between Assets and Poverty 
 
4.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
Depending on the conceptual framework, the relationship between possession of or 
access to certain assets and the condition of poverty can be viewed either as a profile of 
poverty or an attempt to understand its determinants. Based on a static optimization 
model of household production and consumption, it is possible to derive a relationship 
between household spending and asset levels which is open to empirical evaluation.  
 
In fact, assuming that households as producers maximize benefits subject to the usual 
technological restrictions (i.e. production function) and as consumers maximize their 
welfare by optimizing consumption and work decisions given the level of utility 
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obtained, it is possible to establish a direct connection between possession and access to 
assets and household spending levels.  
 
Following Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) and Singh et.al. (1986), we assume that the 
household behaves as if production and consumption/work decisions are made 
sequentially and therefore we can solve the optimization problem recursively in two 
steps. In the first step the production problem is solved and in the second step the 
consumption problem is solved. Therefore the problem of optimization of the household 
as a producer will be: 
 
Max (qa,x,l) π = pa qa - px x – wl 
                                                                                                   (2) 
      s.t.: g(qa,x,l,Aq)=0,                                                       
 
where qa is the quantity produced at a price pa, x are the variable factors used in the 
production process and l is the amount of hours of work used with a price w. g(0) 
represents the production function and the assets that affect the production decision (e.g. 
fix capital, and size of the plot) are captured in Aq. 
 
The reduced form of the model is therefore, 
 
Supply function:  qa  =    qa ( pa  , px  , w ; Aq ) 
Factor demands:  x  =    x ( pa  , px  , w ;Aq ) 
     l   =    l (pa  , px  , w ; Aq ) 
Maximum profit:  π*  =  π* ( pa  , px  , w ; Aq )                                         (3) 
 
 
In the second stage the consumption/work problem is solved, given the level of profit π* 
achieved in production: 
 
Max ( c , cl )  u(c,cl ;Ah),                                                                                            
s.t:  pc c + wcl = π* + wE,           (4) 
     cl + ls = E,          
 
where c the set of goods consumed by the household at prices pc, c1 and ls are the time the 
household assigns to work in the house and hours of work out of the household 
respectively with a total time constraint of E. Finally, Ah are assets that affect the 
consumption decision. 
 
The reduced form of the sequential model can then be expressed in terms of the demand 
function for goods: 
 
                                               c = c ( pa  , pm  , w , y* ; Ah )                                              (5) 
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where  y* = pa qa - px x - wl + wE. From this demand functions we can then obtain an 
expenditure function for the household: 
 
                                           G = c . pc = G(p;A),                                                                (6)   
 
Where p is the price vectors and A is the vector of possession of assets that include all the 
assets the household can access. Even more, these assets can be subdivided according to 
the degree of transferability into private assets (Apriv), public assets (Apub) and 
organizational assets (Aorg).  
 
Therefore our equation of expenditures can be expressed as: 
      
                        G = G(p;Apriv,Apub,Aorg)                                                               (7)   
 
We run a set of models including separately each of the following groups of explanatory 
variables: neighboring public assets, private assets and individual characteristics.  We 
then identify the direct externality effects from the presence of each8.  
 
Finally, we try to identify the critical amount and combination of public and private 
assets needed to overcome these poverty traps by correctly targeting investment in public 
infrastructure in poorer districts. We model at least three types of public goods and 
services: a) “traditional infrastructure” such as transportation, sewer systems, water, 
electricity which does not generate positive network externalities; b) "human-capital-
generating public services" that are capable of creating mobile private assets, such as 
schooling and health services and c) "information and communication technologies", 
such as telephone or Internet, all of which generate network externalities For example, an 
information highway is intrinsically different from a transportation highway.  
 
To test the growth impact of the public assets that generate network externalities we will 
use the fact that the impact of these types of assets on the income of the households will 
not be linear (e.g. telecommunications), as the income impact might be larger whenever a 
significant network size is achieved. This would imply that positive growth effects in 
income might be subject to having achieved a critical mass in a given infrastructure.  
 
In order to test whether such non-linearities exist, and if so what the critical mass is, we 
will include in equation (7) the quadratic terms of the stock of those assets in the specific 
districts of the household. If the coefficient of the stock of this asset is negative and the 
coefficient of its squared term positive, then we will have evidence in support of a 
“critical mass” theory, in which the impact might be insignificant in low intensities of 
such asset. 
 
                                                          
8 Escobal, Torero (2000) additionally test the hypothesis of the presence of spatial concentration, they 
analyze the importance of neighboring effects by measuring the significance of spatial autocorrelation in 
each of our specifications and test how it decreases as we include additional groups of regressors. They 
model spatial dependence as a nuisance (a nuisance since it only pertains to the errors).  Formally, this 
dependence is expressed by means of a spatial process for the error terms, either of an autoregressive or a 
moving average form (see Anselin, 1988 and 1990, and Anselin, Varga, and Acs, 1996) 
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Assuming, for example, a quadratic function on the assets, the effect of an increase in one 
of them on household expenditure can be expressed as:  
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Which implies that the asset elasticity will be equal to: 
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and the cross elasticity will be: 
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Therefore, we can estimate the own and complementary elasticities –given controls for 
all other public and private assets will be included- effects of the different types of assets. 
The analysis of these elasticities as well as some simulations that are carried on should 
shed light  in the complementary nature of public investments and their pattern across the 
income (expenditure) distribution should make evident the presence of important non-
linearities in public  investments. 
 
In future research we will study which combinations of assets will be the ones with the 
higher complementarities to be able to study, which combinations of infrastructure 
investments will be the optimal ones taking into consideration the costs associated with 
the different types of investments9. 
 
 
4.2. Some Preliminary Empirical Results 
 
 
Graphs 3,4 and 5 show for the different assets under study what is its distribution pattern 
between poor and non poor rural dwellers (for descriptive statistics see Tables A.1 and 
A.2). Graph 3 shows the importance of variables such as education attainment both of the 
household head and of all other members older than fourteen years. Here it is obvious 
that those households with more education also have in average a higher level of 
                                                          
9 We will try to use a framework on net social present value and social internal rate of return to be able to 
take into account not only the benefits but also the different costs of each type of infrastructure. 
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expenditure. On the other hand this relationship is not so clear in the case of access to a 
health center in the village. Even more, when analyzing the number of poor and rich 
households with access to a health center in both cases approximately 30% of the 
households had access. A possible explanation could be the significant expansion plan of 
number of health centers along rural Peru in the last years was targeted to poorer 
households making the distribution of this asset more equitative.  
 
When we look to what we called traditional infrastructure, as access to drinkable water, 
sewerage and access to electricity, we can find a positive relationship between the level 
of expenditure of the households, as a proxy of income, and the access to these public 
utilities. Similarly, the time to a paved road is positively correlated to the level of 
expenditure of the households. There are several benefits that a faster access to paved 
roads can bring to the poor rural households, for example they can reduce the 
transportation access to social and government services, such as health, education, 
justice, policing, and public registries; articulate households with markets; and increase 
opportunities to develop income-earning activities. 
 
Finally, Graph 5 looks to the kernel distribution of access to one of the most important 
assets within what we called information and communication technologies (ICT). 
Information and Communication Technologies include a wide range of services, but 
telephones is the precondition for most of the other ICTs10 and as shown in the graph is 
also had a positive correlation with the level of income (expenditure) of the households. 
The current literature had identified several potential impacts of access to ICTs as for 
example the fact that access to telephone may permit a reduction in the distance related 
constraints which have limited the potential for economic development in rural and 
remote regions. Even more, the access to ICTs increases efficiency and reduces 
transaction costs, including transport costs; provides improved access to information; and 
it strengthens household members as they obtain more product information and improves 
the speed of the responses to market signals.   
 
 
 
                                                          
10 It is important to note that due to the adverse geographic conditions that prevail in rural Peru most of the 
telephone services could only be provided by wireless technologies. 
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Graph 3 
Access to Assets and Poverty: Human Capital Assets 
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Graph 4 
Access to Assets and Poverty: Traditional Infrastructure Assets 
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Graph 5 
Access to Assets and Poverty: Information and Communication Technologies 
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The distribution of assets depicted in the above graphics reveals that although poorer 
household have fewer assets this pattern is not necessarily true for all assets. Graph 6, for 
example shows the distribution of per capita expenditure as a function of access to roads 
and years of education of the household head, Here it becomes apparent that important 
non linearities and complementarities are present in the data. 
 
 
Graph 5 
Per Capita Expenditure, Education and Access to Roads 
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In general this three dimensional graph shows that a larger number of years of education 
and been closer to a main highway is consistent with larger per capita expenditure. This 
pattern, however is not smooth, and as is evident in the data there are important changes 
in the shape of the function that may be accounted by the additional possession (or lack 
of possession) of key private or public assets. To control for this effects we need to 
estimate the expenditure function described in the previous section 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of our econometric methodology. In Table 5 we just run a 
weighted regressions11 in levels and also the fully interactive model. In Table 6 we 
include in addition the sampling framework of the LSMS of 200012. As mentioned by 
Deaton (1997), if the cluster design of the data is ignored, standard formulas for variances 
of estimated means are too small, a result which applies essentially the same way to the 
formulas for the variance-covariance matrices of regression parameters estimated by 
OLS. Therefore to solve this problem we use the procedure developed by STATA for 
correcting the estimated standard errors of the least squares regression.  
 
Our results, once we correct for the sampling framework, show that access to human 
capital assets are of great importance when explaining the level of per capita expenditure. 
Education for example shows a significant and positive effect both of the household head 
and of the other members bigger than fourteen years13. Similarly, the variable measuring 
the migratory experience of the household is significant and positive. Both of these 
variables are important in rural areas because they become part of a mobile asset for the 
household members. The analysis also confirms that access to credit and ownership of assets 
that can be used as collateral has a positive effect on spending and therefore on the probability of 
not being poor. 
 
In addition, reductions in family size have a significant positive impact on the return on 
the above-mentioned assets. The concept that an increase in family size implies an 
increase in the productive resources of the family and therefore an increase in family 
well-being is not empirically sustained. This could justify public intervention in the area 
of family planning, but since the variable is endogenous to other decisions and 
                                                          
11 With respect to the use of sampling weights there is a important controversy both at the theoretical and 
practical level. The discussion basically consists in two issues: (i) include or not the sampling weights and 
the sample design in the estimation of the coefficients ii) to correct or not to correct the standard errors 
associated to those coefficients (Deaton, 1997; Pfeffermann,1993). A weighted regression provides a 
consistent estimate of the population regression function, provided of course the assumption about 
functional form is correct. This is especially relevant in our case in which we are looking at the mean of 
one variable conditional on others. 
12 In surveys of rural areas such as the LSMS, clusters are often villages, so the households in a single 
cluster live near one another, and are interviewed at much the same time during the period that the survey 
team is in the village. As a result, the observations from the same cluster are much more like one another 
than are observations from different clusters. At the simplest they may be neighborhood effects, so that 
local eccentriticities are copied by those who live near one another and become more or less uniform within 
a village (Deaton 1997). 
13 Even more, when including the square term the sign is also positive and significant in both the household 
head and the average education of the household members is saying that the returns to education increase as 
the number of years of education increase. Finally we exclude the square terms from the regression because 
there was colinearity with the interactions. 
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restrictions that affect the household, it is not possible to validate such a policy 
recommendation without first understanding the mechanism of the determination of 
family size. As specified in these calculations the variable could in fact be capturing the 
effect of human capital-related variables that are not easily observable.  
 
When analysing the traditional infrastructure, as expected we find a significant and 
positive impact over expenditure per capita of access to electricity and access to 
infrastructure for drinkable water14. In the specific case of time to paved roads and access 
to primary or secondary schools both of these variables become significant and with the 
expected signs when taking in to account their complementarities with other assets. 
Specifically in the case of roads and as mentioned previously an improvement in the 
transport system could significantly reduce what is a significant constraint on agricultural 
efforts in the rural areas.  The lack of a reliable transportation, reflected in high transport 
and transaction costs, hampers the capacity of rural households to articulate with markets 
and forces them to continue in a subsistence agriculture.  Proximity to markets reduces 
effective prices of agriculture inputs and outputs.  Purchases of modern inputs and sales 
of outputs decline with distance from market, and transport costs influence farm profits 
through input use and crop marketing decisions.  Even more, we find that there is a strong 
complementarity between a closer access to roads and telephones, something consistent 
with the idea of a reduction of transaction costs and an increase to proximity of markets. 
 
Several studies mentioned that telecommunications infrastructure investment lead to 
economic growth in several ways. Basically, as the access to telephone improves the 
costs of doing business fall, and output of households should increase (Andrew Hardy, 
1980; Saunders, J.J. Warford, and B. Wellenius, 1993).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 In this specific case the variable which is positive and significant at 5% level of confidence is the number 
of households with infrastructure for drinkable water. Additionally, these variable could be measuring the 
need to have a critical mass of households connected to the drinkable water system to be able to cover the 
significant fix cost needed to incur.   
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Table 5 
(1) (2)
     Family size -0.1510 -0.1498
(23.956)** (16.103)**
     Age 0.0041 0.0038
(4.065)** (3.238)**
     Average Education of the household head 0.0193 0.0153
(4.424)** (3.131)**
     Gender -0.0150 -0.0609
(0.334) (1.106)
     Average education attained by family 0.0165 0.0146
(3.901)** (3.237)**
     Number of migrants 0.0408 0.0401
(3.211)** (2.223)*
     Possesion of Financial Savings 0.1272 0.1769
(1.915) (2.706)**
     Sewerage 0.0987 0.0744
(2.111)* (1.239)
     Electricity 0.0427 0.0431
(1.355) (0.894)
     Access to Public Phones 0.1371 0.1519
(3.328)** (1.771)*
     Access to Health services -0.0576 -0.0426
(1.759) (0.763)
     Access to Education services -0.0361 -0.0055
(1.014) (0.093)
     Communal Association -0.0442 -0.0863
(1.481) (1.751)*
     Leadership in Communal Associations 0.1365 0.1282
(2.951)** (2.854)**
     Value of Durable goods 0.0000 0.0000
(5.174)** (4.946)**
     Value of Agricultural Equipment 0.0000 0.0000
(1.766) (2.834)**
     Value of Land 0.0000 0.0000
(1.000) (0.174)
     Price of livestock 0.0000 0.0000
(2.109)* (1.747)*
     Distance to Roads -0.0094 -0.0085
(3.811)** (2.061)*
     Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud 0.0539 0.0759
(1.816) (1.887)*
     Roofs made of hay or palm leaves -0.0868 -0.0938
(1.930) (1.795)*
     Wooden floors 0.2372 0.2976
(4.412)** (4.118)**
     Parquet, vinyl or concrete floors 0.1923 0.2313
(5.524)** (4.624)**
     Percentage of Homes with Drinkable water in the Community 0.0013 0.0018
(3.375)** (3.378)**
Constant 7.4045 7.4382
(86.011)** (68.407)**
Observations 1174 1174
R-squared 0.467
F - Statistic 41.94 21.65
F(24, 1149) F(24, 80)
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. The Cook Weisber test for heteroskedasticity was carried and the
null hypothesis of constant variance could not be rejected.
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
(1)  Simple regression analysis
(2)  Regression analysis with sampling frame
Regression Analysis of the per Capita Expenditure in the Household
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Table 6 
(1) (2)
     Family size -0.1499 -0.1490
(24.008)** (16.560)**
     Age 0.0038 0.0034
(3.749)** 0.0000
     Average Education of the household head 0.0175 0.0130
(3.816)** (2.582)**
     Gender -0.0172 -0.0630
(0.389) (1.171)
     Average education attained by family 0.0153 0.0138
(3.641)** (3.004)**
     Number of migrants 0.0425 0.0452
(3.372)** (2.670)**
     Possesion of Financial Savings 0.1291 0.1743
(1.959) (2.529)**
     Sewerage 0.0386 -0.0166
(0.702) (0.271)
     Electricity 0.0838 0.0850
(1.071) (0.974)
     Access to Public Phones 0.0831 0.0272
(1.070) (0.284)
     Access to Health services -0.0504 -0.0373
(1.544) (0.715)
     Access to Education services -0.0874 -0.0629
(1.966)* (1.147)
     Communal Association 0.0164 -0.0157
(0.474) (0.263)
     Leadership in Communal Associations 0.1401 0.1300
(3.063)** (2.993)**
     Value of Durable goods 0.0000 0.0000
(5.605)** (5.155)**
     Value of Agricultural Equipment 0.0000 0.0000
(0.183) (0.548)
     Value of Land 0.0000 0.0000
(1.774) (2.372)**
     Price of livestock 0.0000 (2.960)**
(1.730) (1.525)
     Distance to Roads 0.0014 0.0082
(0.321) (1.359)
     Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud 0.0840 0.1142
(2.506)* (2.713)**
     Roofs made of hay or palm leaves -0.1000 -0.1018
(2.232)* (2.060)*
     Wooden floors 0.2275 0.2734
(4.280)** (3.934)**
     Parquet, vinyl or concrete floors 0.1851 0.2159
(5.317)** (4.549)**
     Percentage of Homes with Drinkable water in the Community 0.0011 0.0016
(2.837)** (2.956)**
Regression Analysis of the per Capita Expenditure in the Household using Variables 
Interactions
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Table 6 (Continuation) 
 
(1) (2)
     Squared Value of Land 0.0000 0.0000
(2.399)* (3.174)**
     Sewerage and Access to Public Phones 0.1775 0.2945
(1.860) (2.835)**
     Electricity and Communal Association -0.2052 -0.1799
(3.384)** (2.315)*
     Access to Public Phones and Distance to Roads -0.0155 -0.0245
(2.953)** (3.937)**
     Value of Agricultural Equipment x Price of livestock 0.0000 0.0000
(1.783) (2.388)**
     Average Education of the household head x Access to Public Phones 0.0072 0.0139
(0.802) (1.973)*
     Access to Education services x Electricity 0.1486 0.1347
(2.155)* (1.676)*
     Distance to Roads x Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud -0.0198 -0.0231
(1.901) (1.800)*
Constant 7.4454 7.4828
(83.291)** (70.692)**
Observations 1174 1174
R-squared 0.485
F - Statistic 33.65 .
F(32, 1141) F(31, 73)
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. The Cook Weisber test for heteroskedasticity was carried and the
null hypothesis of constant variance could not be rejected.
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
(1)  Simple regression analysis (2) Regression analysis with sample frame
Regression Analysis of the per Capita Expenditure in the Household using Variables 
Interactions
 
 
 
Even more, and as previously mentioned, telephones as an IT technology are intrinsically 
different from other types of infrastructure: information highways are different from 
transportation highways. The main characteristic which makes this technology different 
and which is not present in other types of infrastructure is network externalities: the more 
users the more value is derived by those users. Given that these network externalities are 
not present in the other types of infrastructure one may expect that the returns of this 
asset will be higher. As expected our results show that access to public telephones15 had a 
significant and positive effect but when interacted with education and time to paved 
roads, showing not only its importance by itself but also its complementarity with assets 
of the other two types previously described. 
 
Among the additional most important interactions that are shown to be significant we 
should mention some obvious like the complementarity’s between access to road 
                                                          
15 Is important to mention that fix telephones are not relevant in rural areas in Peru because of the extreme 
adverse geography which makes extremely costly the installation of fix phones, therefore access to public 
phones is the relevant IT variable for these areas. 
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infrastructure and the fact that the house has better roofs which could be a result of a 
major market value of the house once there is a close by paved road. At the same time 
several interaction point to complementarity’s nature on public and private assets, for 
example between access to education infrastructure and access to electricity.  
 
Finally, statistical evidence was found that variables of public and organizational capital 
such as being director of the local organizations have a similar positive impact.  
 
In the next section, using the parameters estimated from the spending equations, we 
calculated the impact of changes in the ownership and access to complementary assets on 
the level of expenditure.  
 
 
4.3. Simulating the Impact of Access to different Types of Asset  
 
Using the expenditure function estimated above we have run some simulations to show 
not only the importance of key assets in explaining per-capita expenditure, but also the 
importance of complementarity in the allocation of public infrastructure. 
 
Table 7 shows how much will per capita expenditure increase if we provide some 
additional infrastructure to rural dwellers. Here we evaluate the impact of public phones, 
education, sewerage systems and road infrastructure in each of the 5 quintiles of the rural 
expenditure distribution. For example Access to public phones will increase per-capita 
expenditure by less than 2% in the poorest quintile of the distribution and will increase it 
by 12% for  the richest quintile of the distribution. A similar pattern can be observed with 
respect to access to other key assets that we evaluate here. 
 
Table 7 
1 2 3 4 5
     Access to Public Phones 1.72% 3.75% 5.45% 6.10% 12.04%
     Access to Primary and Secondary Schools 3.27% 3.45% 4.47% 5.87% 6.97%
     Access to Sewerage 3.41% 3.53% 4.11% 4.07% 7.57%
     Access to Main Road (reduction in 1 hour) 0.95% 1.04% 1.30% 1.17% 1.52%
     Access to Main Road (reduction in 2 hours) 1.90% 2.09% 2.61% 2.36% 3.06%
Variation in Household Expenditure through access to selected assets
(By quintiles - percentage)
 
 
Table 8 shows the results of these simulations contrasting the effects of provision of 
public infrastructure between poor and non-poor rural dwellers. As expected although all 
rural inhabitants benefit with the provision of additional public infrastructure, non-poor 
rural dweller tend to benefit more.  This is obviously the effect of the additional private 
(and public) asset endowment that non-poor have in comparison with the rural poor. A 
better educated rural dweller typically positioned in the richest quintile may use the same 
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public infrastructure in more profitable way than a less educated  rural dweller positioned 
in the poorest quintile. 
 
 
Table 8 
     Access to Public Phones
     Access to Primary and Secondary Schools
     Access to Sewerage
     Access to Main Road (reduction in 1 hour)
     Access to Main Road (reduction in 2 hours)
8.26%
1.37%
2.76%
3.87%
1.06%
2.14%
No Poor Poor
Variation in Household Expenditure through access to selected assets
(Percentage)
6.24%
6.04%
3.75%
3.43%
 
 
 
Table 9 
 
     Access to Public Phones 1
     Access to Primary and Secondary Schools 2
     Access to Sewerage 3
     Access to Main Road (reduction in 1 hour) 4
     Access to Main Road (reduction in 2 hours) 5
1 2 3 4 5
5.06% 7.34% 10.17% 12.33% 19.85%
33.44% 36.05% 37.70% 39.18% 42.49%
4.25% 6.33% 8.07% 8.74% 14.82%
6.84% 8.97% 10.75% 11.43% 17.67%
6.79% 7.10% 8.77% 10.18% 15.06%
4.25% 4.53% 5.83% 7.11% 8.59%
5.24% 5.62% 7.20% 8.37% 10.24%
0.95% 1.04% 1.30% 1.17% 1.52%
1.90% 2.09% 2.61% 2.36% 3.06%
37.81% 40.75% 43.86% 47.35% 52.42%
8.38% 10.83% 13.99% 16.08% 23.93%
11.81% 14.43% 17.93% 19.96% 28.16%
37.66% 40.47% 42.47% 43.82% 47.35%
42.02% 45.04% 47.40% 48.63% 52.38%
7.80% 8.22% 10.17% 11.47% 16.81%
8.82% 9.34% 11.60% 12.77% 18.59%
42.17% 45.32% 48.84% 52.27% 57.62%
46.67% 50.05% 53.99% 57.35% 62.99%
1 + 3 + 4 
2 + 3 + 4
1 + 3 + 5
1 + 2 + 3 + 5
1 + 3
1 + 4
2 + 3
2 + 4
1 + 5
Variation in Household Expenditure through simultaneous access to selected assets
(By quintiles - percentage)
1 + 2
2 + 5
3 + 5
1 + 2 + 4
1 + 2 + 5
3 + 4
1 + 2 + 3
2 + 3 + 5
1 + 2 + 3 + 4
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Table 9 and 10 show the combined effect of delivering public infrastructure to the rural 
inhabitants of Peru. Two very interesting conclusion emerge from analyzing these 
simulations. First the results show a positive effect of being able to access to more than 
one asset at the same time. The combination of one or more assets sometimes increase the 
impact over the welfare of the households in more than the sum of its individual impacts, 
and in some case the effect is multiplicative. Second, complementarity investments tend 
to close the gap between poor a non poor rural dwellers. For example while investing in 
public phones increases per capita expenditures in the richest and poorest quintile in 12% 
and less than 2%, respectively, adding an additional investment, like improved roads 
increases per capita expenditures in the richest and poorest quintile in 18% and about 7%, 
respectively. Adding a third asset, like sewerage, increases per capita expenditures in the 
richest and poorest quintile in 52% and  42%, respectively. This is consistent with the 
idea that the simultaneous provision of public assets is an effective way of equalizing 
opportunities between the poor and non poor.  
 
Table 10 
     Access to Public Phones 1
     Access to Primary and Secondary Schools 2
     Access to Sewerage 3
     Access to Main Road (reduction in 1 hour) 4
     Access to Main Road (reduction in 2 hours) 5
4.85%
7.31%
9.09%
6.45%
41.21%
2.14%
1.06%
5.96%
1 + 2 + 3 + 5
1 + 2 + 3
18.91%
22.93%
44.58%
49.47%
14.21%
10.95%
13.70%
2.76%
48.58%
12.66%
7.70%
9.18%
1.37%
1 + 3 + 5
2 + 3 + 4
2 + 3 + 5
1 + 2 + 3 + 4
1 + 2 + 4
1 + 2 + 5
1 + 3 + 4 
1 + 5
2 + 3
2 + 4
2 + 5
3 + 4
3 + 5
36.11%
No Poor Poor
1 + 2 15.02%
39.85%
8.45%
9.60%
1 + 3
1 + 4
Variation in Household Expenditure through access to selected assets
(Percentage)
7.76%
11.30%
14.95%
40.58%
45.19%
45.84%
50.63%
15.77%
53.61%
58.80%
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V. Preliminary Conclusions 
 
This study has attempted to better understand the connection between assets and poverty. 
Although we also evaluate the fact that geographic externalities arising from natural 
geographic characteristics, like the adverse ones present in Peru, could be the main 
reason explaining why poor households cannot escape out of poverty. Our results show 
that what seem to be sizable geographic differences in living standards in Peru can be 
almost fully explained when one takes into account the spatial concentration of 
households with readily observable non-geographic characteristics, in particular public 
and private assets.  
Our analysis concentrated then in studying the impact on poverty of having access to 
public and private assets. We study three types of public goods and services: traditional 
infrastructure, human-capital-generating public services and information and 
communication technologies with their additional characteristic of network externality. 
The study showed the differential impact on poverty of each of these types of 
investments, as well as the interaction effect between so- called traditional types of 
infrastructure and those, which generate network externalities.  
Within the human capital generating public services education (both attainment and 
access to primary and secondary schools in the village), family size, and social capital are 
of significant importance in explaining the state of poverty of individuals. The analysis 
also confirms that ownership of assets that can be used as collateral has a positive effect 
on spending and on the probability of not being poor 
On the other hand, statistical evidence was found that access to traditional infrastructure 
such as water; sewerage, electricity and paved roads have a similar impact as the human 
capital generating public services. In this respect, the empirical analysis is consistent with 
the view that the behind the unequal access to assets underlies the problem of poverty. 
Finally, access to telephones, the main information and communication technology 
available in rural Peru also had a significant positive effect on the welfare of rural 
households. 
  
Even more when looking to the complementarities of the assets the results show a 
positive effect of being able to access to more than one asset at the same time. In this 
sense the combination of one or more assets sometimes increase the impact over the 
welfare of the households in more than the sum of its individual impacts, and in some 
case the effect is multiplicative. For example, a poor household has access to telephone 
only its expenditure will increase in 4%, if it has only access to a road one hour less than 
previously its expenditure will increase in 1%, meanwhile if both assets are given to the 
household simultaneously its expenditure will increase in 7%. Even more, if in addition 
this household has access to primary and secondary schools in its village then its 
expenditure will increase in more than 11%, while the arithmetic sum of the increase in 
expenditure of having each asset alone was only 7%. This result clearly shows the role of 
public policy in terms of provision of services and infrastructure as a mechanism to 
strengthen the return from private assets and thus facilitates reduction of poverty. The 
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results also show that the additional provision of public goods serves as a equalizing 
force between the rural poor and the non poor. 
  
In future, research given the indivisible and irreversible nature of most of these 
investments, we intend to evaluate the critical mass of investments of each type required 
to generate the externalities and positive spillovers onto private assets for effective 
poverty reduction strategies, as well a in which could be the optimal baskets of assets that 
poor households need to receive to move out of poverty. 
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Informática: population and household characteristics. 
• Third National Agrarian Census 1994, Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática: 
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• Basic Needs Map 1994. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática: basic needs and 
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province or district was selected according to the position of its centroid on the thematic map: 
earthquake zones, precipitation, soils and vegetation. 
• Natural Resources in Peru 1995, Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales: bioclimate and 
land potential scores. 
• Social Investment Map 1994, FONCODES: altitude and geographic location. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A.1. 
Basic Statistics of Our Variables 
Mean Median Standard Deviation
Personal and Family Characteristics of the Household Head
     Gender 0.90 1.00 0.31
     Age 45.32 42.00 15.22
     Marital Status 0.51 1.00 0.50
     Family size 5.12 5.00 2.12
     Number of migrants 0.76 0.00 1.05
Human Capital Assets
     Average education attained by family 5.97 6.00 3.44
     Average Education of the household head 6.07 6.00 3.79
     Access to Primary School 0.81 1.00 0.39
     Access to Secondary School 0.24 0.00 0.43
     Access to Health services 0.29 0.00 0.45
     Communal Association 0.70 1.00 0.46
     Leadership in Communal Associations 0.09 0.00 0.28
Physical Capital Assets
     Brick and concrete walls 0.07 0.00 0.26
     Wooden walls 0.17 0.00 0.38
     Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud 0.34 0.00 0.48
     Roofs made of hay or palm leaves 0.14 0.00 0.34
     Wooden floors 0.09 0.00 0.28
     Parquet, vinyl or concrete floors 0.21 0.00 0.41
     Value of Durable goods 4,279.48 3,841.63 3,576.86
     Value of Agricultural Equipment 292.55 101.97 811.63
     Value of Land 3,715.37 2,244.15 4,409.16
     Price of livestock 1,967.62 492.39 4,168.02
Financial Capital Assets
     Possesion of Financial Savings 0.04 0.00 0.20
Traditional Infrastructure
     Drinkable water 0.35 0.00 0.48
     Sewerage 0.10 0.00 0.30
     Electricity 0.34 0.00 0.48
     Distance to Roads 2.45 0.60 5.50
     Percentage of Homes with Electricity in the Community 34.33 0.00 42.40
     Percentage of Homes with Drinkable water in the Community 35.26 16.67 38.56
Information and Communication Technologies
     Percentage of Homes with Telephone in the Community 14.82 0.00 32.30
     Access to Public Phones 0.15 0.00 0.36
Rural Peru
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Table A.2: Basic Statistics by Quintile 
Mean Median St. Dv. Mean Median St. Dv. Mean Median St. Dv. Mean Median St. Dv. Mean Median St. Dv.
Personal and Family Characteristics of the Household Head
     Gender 0.91 1.00 0.28 0.89 1.00 0.31 0.91 1.00 0.29 0.89 1.00 0.31 0.87 1.00 0.34
     Age 44.00 42.00 12.65 42.80 40.00 14.39 44.76 42.00 15.54 45.73 44.00 15.74 49.35 47.00 16.76
     Marital Status 0.54 1.00 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.46 0.00 0.50
     Family size 6.77 7.00 2.05 5.50 5.00 1.97 5.23 5.00 1.74 4.55 4.00 1.76 3.52 3.00 1.61
     Number of migrants 0.76 0.00 1.21 0.78 0.00 1.05 0.71 0.00 0.99 0.84 0.00 1.06 0.68 0.00 0.94
Human Capital Assets
     Average education attained by family 5.09 5.25 2.50 5.65 6.00 3.09 6.15 6.00 2.94 6.07 6.00 3.67 6.91 7.00 4.45
     Average Education of the household head 5.11 6.00 3.08 5.64 6.00 3.54 6.16 6.00 3.64 6.35 6.00 3.90 7.08 6.00 4.41
     Access to Primary School 0.85 1.00 0.36 0.83 1.00 0.38 0.79 1.00 0.41 0.81 1.00 0.39 0.78 1.00 0.42
     Access to Secondary School 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.21 0.00 0.40
     Access to Health services 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.27 0.00 0.45
     Communal Association 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.59 1.00 0.49
     Leadership in Communal Associations 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.10 0.00 0.30
Physical Capital Assets
     Brick and concrete walls 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.11 0.00 0.31
     Wooden walls 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.12 0.00 0.33
     Roofs made of tiles or rush mat with mud 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.41 0.00 0.49
     Roofs made of hay or palm leaves 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.16 0.00 0.36 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.06 0.00 0.23
     Wooden floors 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.12 0.00 0.33 0.05 0.00 0.21
     Parquet, vinyl or concrete floors 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.38 0.00 0.49
     Value of Durable goods 3,759.44 3,626.52 2,574.16 3,620.73 3,465.45 2,846.55 4,158.35 3,735.27 3,836.61 4,391.10 4,084.36 3,420.84 5,472.85 4,730.84 4,573.13
     Value of Agricultural Equipment 153.25 90.77 185.50 197.17 84.56 564.95 276.92 110.15 565.34 420.32 118.38 1,287.89 415.60 132.24 955.91
     Value of Land 3,576.69 2,423.74 3,490.04 3,204.09 1,994.80 3,268.19 3,636.14 1,994.80 4,570.58 3,945.82 2,244.15 4,744.44 4,216.23 2,423.74 5,543.48
     Price of livestock 1,747.67 614.98 2,389.64 1,612.81 333.13 2,916.48 1,940.01 678.79 2,919.98 2,435.44 622.38 6,522.92 2,102.77 299.22 4,633.75
Financial Capital Assets
     Possesion of Financial Savings 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.00 0.27
Traditional Infrastructure
     Drinkable water 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.46 0.00 0.50
     Sewerage 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.18 0.00 0.38
     Electricity 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.51 1.00 0.50
     Distance to Roads 3.29 1.00 6.94 2.75 1.00 5.90 2.57 1.00 5.47 2.10 0.40 5.27 1.54 0.30 3.02
     Percentage of Homes with Electricity in the Community 23.81 0.00 37.55 26.52 0.00 38.95 35.04 0.00 43.36 38.71 0.00 43.52 47.61 51.52 44.19
     Percentage of Homes with Drinkable water in the Community 24.22 8.33 32.34 31.98 16.67 36.81 36.45 16.67 38.02 36.60 16.67 39.45 47.12 50.00 42.22
Information and Communication Technologies
     Percentage of Homes with Telephone in the Community 12.44 0.00 30.36 11.35 0.00 29.53 13.79 0.00 31.76 15.97 0.00 33.46 20.57 0.00 35.48
     Access to Public Phones 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.14 0.00 0.34 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.23 0.00 0.42
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